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RECENT DECISIONS
AnMIRALTY-R.EcoVERY FOR NEGLIGENT lNvAsION oF CoNTRAaruAL

!Nnm-

SmP-A fishing vessel just beginning a voyage was negligently
struck by another ship and laid up for a period of time for repairs. The crew
were to have been compensated on the so-called "lay plan," 32% of the gross
catch going to the jointly-owned vessel and gear, and 68% being split equally
among the crew of ten, which included one of the joint owners. On a libel filed
originally by seven of the crew members, but later joined by both owners and
the remaining two of the crew, the trial court allowed recovery of the cost of
repairs to the vessel and the full value of the lost catch, this last being apportioned as per the gross catch split outlined above, the crew sharing only as the
real parties in interest. 1 On appeal, held, the trial judgment reversed as to the
nine non-owner crew members but affirmed as to the owners' recovery of cost
of repairs, 32% of the lost catch, and one tenth of the 68% of the lost catch
apportioned to the crew for the one working owner. The nine crew members
failed because their loss arose "solely out of their contract with the owners,''2 and
thus was governed by the rule in Robins Dry Dock and Repair Co. v. Flint3
denying recovery for negligent interference with a contractual interest. Borcich
v. Ancich, (9th Cir. 1951) 191 F. (2d) 392.
The protected interest in the continued good physical condition of a thing
is generally considered a right in the thing. However, where this thing has been
physically damaged by some negligently tortious act a variety of interests may be
invaded. The interest most directly invaded is compensated for by the costs of
repair, and can generally be thought of as the interest in the marketability and
usability of the undamaged chattel. The costs of such repairs may be recovered
by the person in possession, legal title being of no significance unless lying with
the negligent defendant.4
The other extreme can perhaps be thought of as those incidental interests a
person may have in the continued well being of another man's chattels, and
which become increasingly common as society becomes more economically interdependent. Some may be wholly circumstantial, analogous to the national interest in continued steel production, and are generally not thought of as having
any legal protection. Some may be by way of contract, such as the interest of
an insurer of the object, or of one having a profitable contract to perform some

BST IN UsE OF

1 Ancich v. The Marsha Ann, 92 F. Supp. 929 (1950). The trial court viewed the
case as tried as a single action, 92 F. Supp. at 930, with the crew joined as the real parties
in interest-"And the crewmen, being entitled by the terms of the lay plan to a share of
the profits, would be able to assert their claim to their aliquot portion of the amount recovered by the owner." 92 F. Supp. at 932. This admitted that the crew were to be considered as employees only, and not recovering in their own right.
2 The working owner's recovery of one tenth of the crew's 68% should clearly have
failed under this same logic.
s 275 U.S. 303, 48 S.Ct. 134 (1927).
4 Brewster v. Warner, 136 Mass. 57 at 58 (1883).
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work on the object, such as building a tunnel on land negligently flooded, 5 or
towing a barge negligently sunk.6 These interests arising as incidental to some
contract have not been accorded protection in the courts, unless by way of subrogation. A leading case in this area is Simpson v. Thompson7 in which an
indemnifying insurance company was denied rights in the statutory fund supplied by the vessel which negligently sank the insured vessel. Both ships were
owned by the same person; hence there was no possibility of subrogation. Lord
Penzance took occasion to lay down the proposition that no one could recover
for damage sustained through negligent injury to a person or chattel in which
the claimant's interest was contractual, having "no immediate or reversionary
property in the chattel, and no possessory right by reason of any contract attaching to the chattel itself, such as by lien or hypothecation."8
Somewhere in between these extremes is recovery for the value of the use
of a chattel during the time it is being repaired. That the right to use is a normal incident of the ownership of property is axiomatic, and the owner's right
to recover for his share of the use so lost is demonstrated by the present case.
The interest in the right to use is unique among interests in property in being
so readily divisible by contract, with complex appropriations of the product of
use becoming increasingly common. However, that one not the owner, having
an executory contractual interest in the use so lost, cannot recover is also demonstrated by the present case, and the Robins case.0 This denial must be viewed
as an incident of the rule propounded in Simpson v. Thompson. 10 In the Robins
case direct recovery was denied a charterer for his interest in the full value of
the use of a negligently injured vessel, over and above that of the owner's share
as measured by the hire rate, thus limiting the total recovery for negligent injury
to a chattel when the full value of the use so lost was clearly within the defendant's knowledge. In the present case, indirect recovery, or a sharing in the
recovery initially granted the owners for the full value of the lost use, was also
denied, similarly limiting the eventual recovery for damage, the presence and
value of which had been conceded by the court.11 In both cases the defendant's
5 Cattle v. Stockton Waterworks, L.R. 10 Q.B. 453 (1875).
6 Societe Anonyme de Remorquage
Helice v. Bennetts, [1911]

a
1 K.B. 243. See also
PROSSER, ToRTS 991 et seq. (1941) for discussion of this area and notes 26, 27 and 28,
pp. 992 and 993 for citation of leading articles.
7 3 App. Cas. 279 (1877).
8 Id. at 289. Two other cases, Le Lievre v. Gould, [1893] 1 Q.B. 491, and Savings
Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879), must be viewed as part of this same picture (note
citation in Robins case, 275 U.S. 303 at 309), although they did not involve injuries to
chattels and are now considered more as a part of the law surrounding negligent misrepresentation. See PROSSER, ToRTS 737 (1941).
o Text, infra.
lO See citation of Elliot Steam Tug Co. v. The Shipping Controller, [1922] 1 K.B.
127, 139, 140, in the Robins case, 275 U.S. 303 at 309 (1927) and discussion of Elliot
case in Rosco:a, TH:B MEAsURE OP DAMAGES IN MAmnM:B CoLLISIONS, 3d ed., 40, note
(g) (1929).
11 See note I supra as to the trial court basing the crew's recovery on the owner's right
to recover. Of further interest is Van Camp Sea Food Co. v. Di Leva, (9th Cir. 1948)
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liability was limited merely because a contractual division had been made in the
interest in the right to use. 12 A better solution would appear to be full recovery
for the objective value of the lost use with perhaps the limitation that all parties
having a contractual interest in the right to use be joined to avoid a multiplicity
of suits and possible double recovery. Where the damage suffered was by way
of an incidental interest in the continued well being of the chattel the rule in
the Simpson case may still be a sound limitation for policy reasons.

Duncan Noble, S.Ed.

171 F. (2d) 454, wherein, on facts very similar to the present case, the crew was allowed
to recover directly because both vessels were owned by the same peison and he could not

be expected

to sue himself. The contrast with the Simpson case, note 8 supra, is striking.
Perhaps the different results may be explained in part at least by the difference of the
rights in which the plaintiffs had interests by contract. The court of appeals in the present
case chose to limit the Van Camp case to its "own peculiar facts," 191 F. (2d) at 398.

12 In the Robins case, Justice Holmes met this point by refuting the owners' right to
recover the full value of the lost use had they sued. 275 U.S. 303 at 309. However, this
does not appear to be the American view, unless so settled by the Robins case. See 39
HARV, L. REv. 760 (1925). In 1883 an action "on behalf of the owner, master, and crew"
of a fishing vessel resulted in recovery of the full value of the lost catch. The Risoluto,
[1883] 8 P.D. 109. Apparently such fishing cases have not been viewed as part of the
controversy over subjective or objective valuation of the lost use. See RoscoE, THE MEAsuu OF DAMAGES IN MAmn:ME CoLI.ISIONs, 3d ed., 99 (1929). See also the excellent
discussion of the circuit court decision in the Robins case in 40 HARv. L. REv. 302 at 304
(1926). The present writer does not agree with the conclusion there noted that the charterer did not have a "property interest'' in the ship, and would cite TlllU\Y, l.EA»mc PBINCIPLES OF ANcLo-AMmu:CAN I.Aw 340 (1884), in refutation of the point taken. The
decision in the Aquatania, (D.C. N.Y. 1920) 270 F. 239, which protected the charterer's
interest in the right to use as a "property interest" seems well reasoned and essential to
avoiding the denial of recovery to the charterer. Otherwise the rule in the Simpson case
at least seems applicable to deny direct recovery, although indirect recovery would seem
logical even lacking a "property interest" definition.

